|
LOS ANGELES -- Is China's foreign policy deck of cards now all negotiation
and diplomacy rather than shrill confrontation and bizarre reclusiveness?
For all appearances, this indeed is the dominant face card of modern
Chinese diplomacy today.
Instructing
its diplomats around the world that they are now pretty much in
the driver's seat, the ruling elite of the most populous nation
wants an image of negotiated approaches to issues and tensions.
This arises not from mushy internationalism but from a precise calculation
of national interest -- the desire to expand the Chinese economy,
undistracted by side issues, ruined by costly wars or debilitated
by an impasse with the United States.
But can Beijing
keep its hawks from pushing panic buttons and reminding the world
of the bad old China? That's the millennial issue, to be sure; but,
whatever the motive, Chinese diplomats these days, for the first
time in memory, feel empowered by their Beijing bosses to advance
a consistent diplomatic approach to virtually every issue. Even
for the ever-contentious Taiwan imbroglio, they are to play it cool
and display as best as possible the unruffled feathers of a dove.
And it's not
always just nice-talk. Regarding Taiwan, for example, notice the
sudden decision of Beijing's all-powerful State Council to leave
the door open to regular direct flights between the offshore island
and the mainland. That's unprecedented. Regarding the shape of the
government coming to power soon, note its emerging texture -- far
more technocratic than ideological. Holly Mao!
To test the
current temperature of a high-level Chinese diplomat, I recently
called on Zhong Jianhua, China's diplomatic representative on America's
West Coast. In an extensive interview, the former director general
of China's consular department in the Foreign Ministry underscored
the new diplomatic image of China: that no foreign-policy position
was immune to review, that China wanted anything but violence with
Taiwan, that the rise of an increasingly assertive middle class
throughout China would inevitably put the nostrums of even legendary
leaders like Deng Xiaoping to the test, and that even the harsh
policy on dissidents was far from frozen in cement.
Diplomatically
speaking, of course, China's key relationships include the United
States and -- in East Asia -- North and South Korea, not to mention
Japan and Russia. But no nation is more important to China than
the United States, its largest commercial market, and the sole power
capable of inflicting mortal harm. Not surprisingly, then, Zhong
Jianhua struck an upbeat note about President George Bush, whom
he depicted as a politician who'd quickly come a long distance in
recognizing the need for China and the United States to forge a
common-sense appreciation of each other's core national-security
needs. Flatly predicted Consul General Zhong, "If there is
to be a serious bilateral bump, it will be because of something
completely unpredictable."
But that bump
-- more like the surfacing of a gigantic whale -- may just have
materialized, in the form of new tension on the two-Koreas issue.
This is bad news for the Chinese, not just the Koreans. Beijing
is stuck with long-standing ideological ally North Korea, pure dead
weight on the Chinese full-steam-ahead economy. Pyongyang takes
economic and some military aid from China and returns little but
grief, mainly in the form of refugees into China or that out-of-the-blue
1998 missile test shot that somehow arched over Japan. Beijing doesn't
need this; it needs, for starters, powerhouse South Korea's economic
trade and cooperation.
Once opposed
to reunification of the Koreas, China now could live with it --
if the peninsula were made non-nuclear and non-threatening. In late
1999, that possibility seemed closer than ever; but the incoming
Bush administration -- with a skeptical Republican right wing looking
over its shoulder and a prodigiously anti-Communist Texan at the
helm -- slowed the process down to a crawl.
Sure, a tough-guy
approach of isolating -- rather than negotiating with -- North Korea
might make sense (and in fact would have moral value) if Pyongyang
hadn't already isolated itself and if the decades-long tough U.S.
stance in South Korea, backed by nearly 40,000 troops, had made
Pyongyang more sensible. It hasn't: North Korea is still capable
of almost anything. That's why it'd be wrong now to create moral
standards that could have the ultimate practical effect of sending
Seoul into flames.
So what's obviously
needed is a jump-start of the diplomatic process that Bush has been
devaluing. Who can come to the rescue? South Korean President-elect
Roh Moo Hyun is too new. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
has little diplomatic powder left after his bold trip to Pyongyang
last year. Russian President Vladimir Putin has some leverage, but
not much. And the Bush administration -- showing symptoms of diplomatic
bipolar disorder: periodic manic attacks of Texan tough love followed
by listless rounds of lackluster diplomacy -- seems off-balance.
One outside
force that could prove effective is China -- presumably Pyongyang
would listen to its last ally on Earth -- but China must do more
than stand by and watch. In coordination with Seoul and Tokyo, and
by the avoidance of grandstanding that would cause the Bush administration
to look bad in the region, Beijing should stop playing only face
cards. If the Chinese government has a hole card, now is the time
to show it. That would be further evidence that the new Chinese
diplomacy is more than card games.
|