China's unpredictable future

It's not just China's domestic affairs that have kept the Communist Party in charge, writes Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom

By Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom
AsiaMedia Contributing Writer

Monday, June 4, 2007

Eighteen years ago, with protesters marching through scores of Chinese cities and giant crowds gathering in Beijing's Tiananmen Square, many outside observers, myself included, assumed that the era of Communist Party rule in China was nearing its end.  The June 4 Massacre of 1989, which demonstrated that the Party was determined not to go gently into that good night, led us to backtrack quickly.

But when the Berlin Wall collapsed a few months later, many began again to assert again that the Beijing regime must be on its last legs. After all, not only had domestic developments shown how disliked the Party was by the "People" in whose name it claimed to rule, but the international zeitgeist seemed to be pointing to a future free of Communist rule in all lands.

How then have observers accounted for the failures of those confident "end of history" predictions in a 21st century that sees Communist Party leaders continuing to call the shots in Beijing, Pyongyang, Hanoi and Havana?

In China, one tendency has been to separate the domestic and international storylines. The surprising persistence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is chalked up to internal factors. Much is made of the leadership's ability to find effective ways to appease or buy off some groups (entrepreneurs, for example) and to terrify or simply keep separated from one another individuals who dissent. Attention is also paid to how the regime has skillfully played the nationalism card, has managed to help the economy grow at unprecedented rates, and has pulled back from micromanaging the private lives of the population, a major cause of discontent in 1989.

External developments, by contrast, are typically seen as still indicating that the CCP still lives on borrowed time. International trends, it continues to be thought by many, suggest that Beijing's current regime will ultimately go the way of both the Communist ones that ran Soviet bloc countries and the non-Communist authoritarian groups that controlled South Korea and Taiwan before those East Asian countries democratized.

What's wrong with this picture?

The main problem is not with how the preceding account handles domestic Chinese trends, but rather its treatment of the international situation. It obscures from view the extent to which recent international developments have, albeit frequently indirectly or in surprising ways, played into the hands of the regime. Yes, in the end, the regime will fall, as no leadership group lasts forever. But a strong a case can be made for the claim that international trends have contributed to, not worked to limit the longevity of Communist rule in China.

What has happened since 1989 in former state socialist countries has generally buttressed more than undermined the legitimacy of the CCP. The collapse of the Berlin Wall was widely seen as something that increased the likelihood that China would soon abandon Communist Party rule. Then came events of the 1990s, such as the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia's decline as a world economic power, and the former Yugoslavia's free-fall into chaos. These developments strengthened the hand of the Beijing regime, making it easy for the Party to say to the people in effect, though never in quite these words: "You may be tired of Communism, but there seems to be something much worse out there: Post-Communism."

In the new century, meanwhile, external phenomena have again contributed to the regime's longevity. Foreign investors, for example, have made financial decisions that have played a role in China's economic boom. The transformation of Shanghai into a showplace of modernity and symbol of China's resurgence on the world stage was due partly to the things that businesses based in Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong and the West have done, such as starting joint ventures and helping to finance some of Pudong's tallest skyscrapers.

The instability of 21st century geopolitics has also, indirectly, helped keep the Party afloat. After all, one of the main justifications the CCP offers for maintaining its monopoly on power and taking a go-slow approach to political reform is that the world is a dangerous place, thus a strong, stable government is crucial to prevent being bullied or invaded. One can dispute this position on moral grounds, especially since it is so often used to defend repressive policies carried out in the name of stability. But it is hard to gainsay the notion that the world has seemed a dangerous place for weak states of late.

Closer to home for the Party, recent events in East Asia have indirectly helped the regime as well. Consider, for instance, Japanese leaders' visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine that includes the remains of a handful of war criminals abhorred by the Chinese for their roles in World War II atrocities. The Chinese Communist Party certainly does all it can to publicize these visits and take advantage of the anger they generate by playing the anti-Japanese nationalism card.

North Korea's nuclear ambitions have also helped Beijing in a curious way. Whenever Pyongyang behaves outrageously, this buttresses the notion that the CCP, which has long had a special relationship to North Korea but now has far less volatile leaders, is a necessary organization to have on the scene to keep the notoriously erratic Kim Jong Il in check.

How much longer can the Party defy the odds and stay in power?

This question is impossible to answer with certainty, but recent history tells us one thing:  The Party's fate will continue to depend not just on what happens inside of China but also what happens in the unpredictable world that lies beyond its borders.

A significantly shorter version of this essay was originally written for and distributed by the History News Network. The views expressed above are those of the author and are not necessarily those of AsiaMedia or the UCLA Asia Institute.

Date Posted: 6/4/2007