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LOS ANGELES -- It's frightening how many Chinese in Beijing's government
elite suspect the Bush administration of harboring a secret plan
to keep the Korean peninsula divided. But such Chinese suspicions
about U.S. strategic aims -- that Washington hopes the North/South
face-off continues -- could solidify a wall of mistrust that would
cast a huge and dark shadow over Asia.
The Chinese
figure it this way: Tease the tensions out of North-South relations
and arrange to keep the nukes out forever, and who'd still want
those 37,000 U.S. troops in South Korea? Beijing's answer: Washington.
That's because
many Chinese believe the Bush administration has in mind a grand
strategic design to dominate both the Middle East (starting with
an Iraq offensive) and East Asia (to counter China's growing profile).
Such an ambition
-- a new geopolitical platform, really -- would be harder to achieve
without U.S. troops there. Forward deployment capabilities are not
the same as real bases with 100,000 troops on the ground in Korea
and Japan. That's why peninsula peace, in the Chinese view, would
work against the new Pax Americana.
This broadly
held, disturbing and presumably far-fetched view has some logic
to it. It could explain the Bush administration's brutal chilling
of Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine policy" back in March of 2001.
It could illuminate the motive behind Washington's blustery threats
after North Korea suddenly pleaded guilty last fall to a secret
nuclear program. "You caught us," said the North Koreans
in effect: Right, you caught us -- said the North Koreans: So
you want to make something of it? Throw the first punch and see
how we react!
Many Chinese,
for the record, are convinced that the beleaguered North Koreans
have no serious program and possess no nuclear weapons -- but that's
another story. What's truly worrisome is that so many Koreans in
the South quietly share the Chinese perspective on U.S. intentions.
That's scary: The impact of such a rising cycle of suspicion in
East Asia -- if unabated -- could push South Korea much closer to
China, hand Beijing a staggering diplomatic coup and set in motion
a gradual strategic realignment in East Asia.
The Chinese
retain, to be sure, a certain fraternal and ideological loyalty
to North Korea, with which it fought the capitalists 50 years ago
at the cost of 800,000 men. But today, prosperous, pragmatic South
Korea is the attractive side of Korea that Beijing wants to take
to the dance -- and many southerners are ready for the hop.
How times change:
China is now the South's largest trading partner, grabbing the honor
from the United States. They also share with the Chinese a visceral
dislike of a hubris-ridden America that proposes a new world order
dominated by America. Not even its dynamic new president, Roh Moo-hyun,
will be able to tamp down the anti-Americanism if U.S. big-footedness
proceeds.
To make matters
worse, President George Bush is under growing pressure at home --
from left and right -- to "do something" about the regime
of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. Right-wing GOPers don't buy
the notion that China is an innocent bystander as flustered as everyone
over the North's pranks and unpredictability. Some conservatives,
believing Beijing is, in fact, goading Pyongyang on, want Bush to
punish the North militarily, or at least to hit it with a severe
economic quarantine.
For their part,
many Democrats are eager to embarrass Bush. So they chide him for
beating the drums of military action against Iraq while waving the
peace pipe in front of North Korea. If the president must have war,
they suggest, the more deserving target is the latter -- with its
possible nuclear weapons and far larger military.
With all this
ground shaking under him, Bush, for the time being, seems to be
looking for a temporary out, putting his "no compromise with
evil" policy on hold while offering North Korea food aid, energy
and perhaps even diplomatic inducements to drop its nuclear ambitions.
But that squeezes him in a vise partly of his own making. By questioning
the only approach that ever made sense -- an endlessly patient engagement
policy, even as the North kept childishly throwing its rattle out
of its crib -- he opened up options that appealed to his staunch
anti-communism. But they also appealed to the anti-Americanism in
South Korea, the paranoia in China, the anti-communism in the Republican
right and the ever-present opportunism on the Democratic left.
That's a different
kind of Axis of Evil than Bush anticipated. And this axis has limitless
potential to hurt him.
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